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WARFIELD ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND
HUMAN FREEDOM
Peter A. Graham

Warfield (1997, 2000) argues that divine foreknowledge and human freedom
are compatible. He assumes for conditional proof that there is a necessarily
existent omniscient being. He also assumes that it is possible for there to be a
person who both does something and could have avoided doing it. As support for this latter premise he points to the fact that nearly every participant
to the debate accepts the falsity of logical fatalism. Appealing to this consensus, however, renders the argument question-begging, for that consensus has
emerged only against the backdrop of an assumption that there is no necessarily existent omniscient being.

Warfield (1997) argues in the following way for the compatibility of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom. (Let P = Jones φs in a.d. 2000 and
Jones could have refrained from φ-ing in a.d. 2000, Q = It was true at the
beginning of time that Jones φs in a.d. 2000, G = God exists, O = God is
omniscient, and K = God knows at the beginning of time that Jones φs in
a.d. 2000.)
(1) (G & O)

Premise

(2) ◊(P & Q)

Premise

(3) (Q ⊃ (G & O))

1, classical logic

(4) ((◊(P & Q) & (Q ⊃ (G & O))) ⊃ ◊(P & (G & O))) Necessary Truth
(5) ◊(P & (G & O))

2,3,4 classical logic

(6) ((P & (G & O)) ⊃ K)

Premise

(7) ◊(P & (G & (O & K)))

5,6 classical logic

The conclusion, (7), is the claim that it is possible for Jones to φ in a.d.
2000 freely (i.e., Jones does φ then while he could, at the same time, have
refrained from doing so) even though God knew at the beginning of time
that he would φ in a.d. 2000.
Warfield’s argument is flawed. (6) seems wholly uncontroversial. It
says that necessarily if P is true and God exists and is omniscient, then
God knew at the beginning of time that P. (1), on the other hand, is quite
controversial. But suppose we accept (1). What grounds do we have for
accepting (2)? Warfield says:

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 25 No. 1 January 2008
All rights reserved

75

76

Faith and Philosophy
The problem of logical fatalism has been solved. That is, almost everyone will agree that, for example, the following two propositions
are consistent:
(a) Plantinga will freely climb Mount Rushmore in a.d. 2000
(b) It was true in a.d. 50 that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in a.d. 2000
(b), of course, implies that
(c) Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in a.d. 2000
but casts no doubt on Plantinga’s power to refrain from so doing. If
Plantinga were to refrain from climbing, (b) would not have been
true, but this does not, the refutations of fatalism assure us, require
Plantinga to have objectionable “power over the past.” (Warfield
1997, p. 80)

Warfield’s support for premise (2) then seems to be the fact that “the
problem of logical fatalism has been solved.” That is, he claims to support premise (2) by pointing to the philosophical community and saying,
“Look, see, the philosophical community agrees that (a) and (b) are compossible, therefore it is legitimate for me to appeal to it in an argument for
the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom.” In his
reply to Anthony Brueckner’s critique of his argument in “On Freedom
and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics” Warfield says:
I did not in any way endorse the “strategy” that Brueckner attributes
to me. What I did say in presenting my argument is this: “I assume
that fatalism is false and not merely that the arguments for it are unpersuasive” (p.84, note 3). I take logical fatalism to be the doctrine that
true future tensed propositions about human action are incompatible
with free performance of these actions. The falsity of this position,
then, implies that free action is compatible with true future tensed
propositions describing the actions (and does not merely imply that
certain arguments for the fatalist position are unpersuasive).
Is it in any way dialectically inappropriate to assume the falsity of
logical fatalism in providing my argument for theological compatibilism? I don’t think it is. After all, as noted both in my earlier article
and again in reply to Professor Hasker, I know of no participant in
the foreknowledge debate (compatibilist or incompatibilist) who
does not accept the falsity of logical fatalism. Relevant interlocutors
therefore have no room to disagree with this assumption. (Warfield
2000, pp. 257–58)
Pace Warfield, it is dialectically inappropriate to assume the falsity of logical fatalism in providing his argument for theological compatibilism. If
one accepts (1), i.e., if one accepts that it is a necessary truth that God
exists and is omniscient, then there is no separate question of the truth of
logical fatalism independent of the question of whether human freedom is
compatible with God’s omniscience. That is, if (1) is true, then the question
of whether logical fatalism is false just is the question of whether human
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freedom is compatible with God’s omniscience. Discussions of logical fatalism in the philosophical literature bracket the question of the truth of
(1). In other words, discussions of logical fatalism proceed on the assumption that (1) is false. Thus, if (1) is true, employing (2) in an argument for
(7) is all so much begging the question. If (1) is false, then Warfield’s argument is unsound.
To make more vivid how Warfield’s argument is flawed consider a
structurally analogous argument oﬀered as a response to the traditional
problem of evil. (Let P = there is some unnecessary and undeserved suﬀering in the world, G = God exists, and O = God is omniscient, omnipotent,
and omnibenevolent.)
(1*) (G & O)

Premise

(2*) ◊P

Premise

(3*) (P ⊃ (G & O))

1, classical logic

(4*) ((◊P & (P ⊃ (G & O))) ⊃ ◊(P & (G & O)))

Necessary Truth

(5*) ◊(P & (G & O))

2,3 classical logic

Suppose someone—let’s call him Smith—gave this argument for the
compatibility of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God and the existence of unnecessary and undeserved suﬀering
and oﬀered as his support for (2*) the fact that in his philosophical community everyone accepts that it is possible for there to be unnecessary
and undeserved suﬀering. Suppose that within that community some
philosophers had argued that on the basis of non-theological considerations it was impossible that there be any unnecessary and undeserved
suﬀering. Though the consensus of that philosophical community is that
those arguments are bad and that it is possible for there to be unnecessary
and undeserved suﬀering, it would be dialectically out of place for Smith
to appeal to that consensus as his support for (2*) given that he is assuming (1*) in his argument. The consensus of the philosophical community
that it is possible that there be unnecessary and undeserved suﬀering is
a consensus that brackets the question of the existence of an omniscient,
omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. If those in the philosophical community who accept that it is possible for there to be unnecessary and
undeserved suﬀering don’t even consider the possibility of the necessary
existence of an omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent God, then
appealing to their acceptance of this possibility in an attempt to resolve
the problem of evil surely is not kosher. Either (1*) is true, in which case,
their case for the possibility of unnecessary and undeserved suﬀering
is incomplete without an answer to the traditional problem of evil and,
thus, (2*) of Smith’s argument is wholly unsupported, or (1*) is false, in
which case, Smith’s argument is unsound.
Warfield’s argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and
human freedom is in just as bad shape as is Smith’s resolution of the problem of evil. Both should be rejected.
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
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